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Abstract In preference aggregation a set of individuals express preferences
over a set of alternatives, and these preferences have to be aggregated into a
collective preference. When preferences are represented as orders, aggrega-
tion procedures are called social welfare functions. Classical results in social
choice theory state that it is impossible to aggregate the preferences of a
set of individuals under different natural sets of axiomatic conditions. We
define a first-order language for social welfare functions and we give a com-
plete axiomatisation for this class, without having the number of individuals
or alternatives specified in the language. We are able to express classical
axiomatic requirements in our first-order language, giving formal axioms for
three classical theorems of preference aggregation by Arrow, by Sen, and by
Kirman and Sondermann. We explore to what extent such theorems can be
formally derived from our axiomatisations, obtaining positive results for Sen’s
Theorem and the Kirman-Sondermann Theorem. For the case of Arrow’s
Theorem, which does not apply in the case of infinite societies, we have to
resort to fixing the number of individuals with an additional axiom. In the long
run, we hope that our approach to formalisation can serve as the basis for a
fully automated proof of classical and new theorems in social choice theory.
Keywords Social choice theory · First-order logic · Axiomatisability ·
Preference aggregation · Automated reasoning
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1 Introduction
Social choice theory is a branch of mathematical economics that is concerned
with the design and analysis of methods for collective decision making [3, 14].
Classical results in the field explore the possibility of aggregation in different
settings. Perhaps the most famous one is Arrow’s Theorem [2]; it states that
it is impossible to aggregate the preferences of a finite set of individuals in
a manner that would satisfy a small number of natural properties. In recent
years there has been a growing interest in applications of logic to social choice
theory [11]. In this paper we present a formalisation of several results from
social choice theory in classical first-order logic (FOL). We define a language
that enables us to formalise classical properties of aggregation procedures,
we give axioms for various settings of aggregation, and we explore to what
extent certain classical impossibility theorems can be derived in this formal
framework.
There have been a number of recent contributions that address the formali-
sation of theorems in social choice theory using a variety of logical frameworks
[1, 21, 22, 27, 29, 31]. There are several reasons for this broad interest in
applying tools from mathematical logic to social choice theory. The first of
them is of course that the full formalisation of a problem domain can help
us gain a deeper understanding of that domain. More specifically, in social
choice theory, it can clarify the exact nature of the assumptions that are being
made to derive, for instance, a characterisation result [22]. Second, a com-
plete formalisation together with an automatically derived (or automatically
verifiable) proof can give additional assurances for the correctness of a result.
As pointed out by Blau [5], Arrow’s original proof contained an error; this has
been acknowledged and corrected in the second edition of Arrow’s book [2].
While there has been some discussion in the literature whether the standard
proofs have been worked out in sufficient detail [21], we certainly do not want
to suggest that the major results in social choice theory are not based on sound
foundations. However, for verifying newer and less well studied results, full
formalisation and automated reasoning could prove useful tools.
Previous work has discussed formalisations of Arrow’s Theorem in modal
logic [1], dependence logic,1 and in the language of set theory [21, 31]. Here
we explore to what extent it is possible to model the framework of preference
aggregation in classical FOL. There are several reasons for focusing on FOL:
it is a natural language for speaking about linear orders, which are central
to the modelling of preferences, and the body of literature and results that
a first-order formalisation enable us to apply is bigger than for most other
logical systems. An informal first-order language was also used already in the
work of social choice pioneers like Arrow and Sen,2 and it constitutes a well
1J. Väänänen (personal communication, 2009); see also [30].
2Arrow once took a course with Tarski [7].
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estabilished language that can be easily understood and used in the field of
mathematical economics.
In this work we concentrate on three theorems, proved by Arrow [2],
Sen [25] and Kirman and Sondermann [18]. We are able to show that for two
of these theorems it is possible to completely describe the problem within a
language of FOL based on the language of orders. The exception is Arrow’s
Theorem: for stating that it only applies to the case of a f inite number
of individuals we have to instantiate the statement for a fixed number of
individuals (we will see that Arrow’s Theorem is equivalent to a certain theory
of FOL axioms not having a finite model). In particular, we will not require
any form of second-order quantification, which may seem surprising given
that several of the axioms used, for instance, in Arrow’s Theorem certainly
have a “second-order flavour”. Our axiomatisation draws on several ideas
from an important recent paper by Tang and Lin [27]. In this work, the two
authors provide an alternative proof of Arrow’s Theorem composed of two
inductive mathematical lemmas and an automated proof of the impossibility
for the base case of 3 alternatives and 2 individuals. This last step is performed
utilising a propositional language based on situation calculus, constructing
computer-generated formulas that instantiate Arrow’s conditions. In our pa-
per, we generalise this language to a complete axiomatisation of the Arrovian
framework of social welfare functions in classical FOL. We obtain a logical
language that is both human-readable and easy to implement, and we study
its expressive power formalising several classical impossibility theorems in the
field of preference aggregation using this language.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we recall
the framework of preference aggregation, stating the three theorems that
constitute the object of our analysis. In Section 3 we define a first-order
language for preference aggregation and we present first-order axioms for
social welfare functions and for several conditions introduced in the social
choice literature. The models of these first-order theories are studied in detail
in Section 4, where we prove several axiomatisability results for the theorems
introduced in Section 2. Section 5 concludes and discusses some preliminary
results concerning the use of automated reasoning tools in this setting.
2 Social Welfare Functions and Impossibility Theorems
In this section we review the basic definitions of preference aggregation and we
state three famous theorems [2, 18, 25] that we aim at formalising using a first-
order language. We also present a recent proof method based on induction,
introduced by Tang and Lin [27] to prove Arrow’s Theorem, and we prove a
generalisation of one of their lemmas.
Let N be a set of individuals expressing preferences over a set X of
alternatives. We represent such preferences with a binary relation. In this
paper we concentrate on two representations of preferences: linear and weak
orders. A binary relation is a linear order if it is irreflexive, transitive and
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complete. The term aPib stands for “individual i strictly prefers alternative
a to alternative b”. The choice of a preference relation Pi for each individual
constitutes a preference prof ile P = (P1, . . . , Pn). A weak order is a binary
relation that is reflexive, transitive and complete. We will denote weak orders
with the letter R, thus aRib will stand for “individual i weakly prefers a to b”
and call R = (R1, . . . , Rn) a profile of weak orders. Note that every weak order
R induces an irreflexive and transitive binary relation, usually referred to as
the strict part of R, namely the relation that holds between a and b whenever
aRb holds but bRa does not.
If we denote with L(X ) the set of all linear orders on X , then the set of
all prof iles of (linear) preference orders is the set L(X )N . A social welfare
function (SWF) for X and N is a function w : L(X )N → L(X ). A SWF
associates with every preference prof ile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ L(X )N a linear
order w(P), which in most interpretations is taken to represent the aggregation
of the preferences of the individuals into a “social preference order” over X .
The same definition can be given using the set R(X ) of all weak orders over
X as the domain of aggregation, defining a SWF for N and X as a function
w : R(X )N → R(X ).
In most of the paper we shall assume that preferences are represented as
linear orders, and we give details in Section 3.3 for the generalisation of our
first-order formalisation to the case of SWFs defined on weak orders.
2.1 Arrow’s Theorem
Since the seminal work of Arrow [2], social choice theory has made extensive
use of the axiomatic method to classify and study aggregation procedures.
There are several properties that an aggregation mechanism may satisfy, and
some of them have been argued to be natural requirements for a SWF. In this
section we will concentrate on three properties that have led Arrow to prove
his famous theorem, stated here for the case of linear orders:
• UN: A SWF w satisfies unanimity if, whenever every individual strictly
prefers alternative a to alternative b , so does society. Formally, if aPib for
every individual i ∈ N , then a w(P) b .
• IIA: A SWF w satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives if the social
ranking of two alternatives a and b depends only on their relative ranking
by the individuals. The formal condition is that, given two preference
profiles P and P ′, if for every individual i ∈ N we have that aPib if and
only if aP′ib , then a w(P) b if and only if a w(P
′) b .
• ND: A SWF w is non-dictatorial if there is no individual i ∈ N such that
for every profile P the social preference order w(P) is equal to Pi.
It is important to note that in our definition of SWFs there are two hidden
conditions that could be stated as axioms, but that we have instead included
as an integral part of the formal framework of preference aggregation. The
first is usually called unrestricted or universal domain: it requires a SWF to
be defined over all preference profiles in L(X )N . Domain restrictions, such
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as single-peaked preferences [4], are the most common escape from Arrow’s
impossibility (see, e.g., [13]). The second hidden condition is called collective
rationality, as it is first stated in Arrow [2, Chapter VIII, Section V]. It requires
the outcome of the aggregation to be a linear order, i.e., it requires the outcome
to conform to the same rationality constraints as the input received from the
individuals. Non-comparability or ties between alternatives are not allowed for
a SWF at the collective level.
We are now ready to state Arrow’s celebrated theorem:
Theorem 1 [2] If X and N are f inite and non-empty, and if |X | ≥ 3, then there
exists no SWF for X and N that satisf ies UN, IIA and ND.
Various proofs of this theorem are known [14, 15], and several formulations
can be found in the literature that differ in view of the assumptions on
individual and collective preferences that are being made [28], starting from
Arrow’s original version for weak orders [2]. In Section 2.4 we present one
recent proof of this result that is based on induction.
2.2 Infinite Societies
Given our interest in a logical formalisation of impossibility results such
as Arrow’s Theorem, we have to question the assumption of finiteness in
Theorem 1. There are two parameters in Arrow’s Theorem: the number of
alternatives and that of individuals. If we relax the assumption of finiteness
for the set of alternatives X , then the statement continues to hold.3 If instead
the set of individuals is allowed to be infinite, then the impossibility does
not hold anymore: there exists a unanimous and independent SWF that is
also non-dictatorial on infinite societies, as has first been pointed out by
Fishburn [12]. Independent and unanimous SWFs on infinite domains can
nevertheless be characterised, and a general form of Arrow’s Theorem be
proved without restrictions on the cardinality of N . This result is due to
Kirman and Sondermann [18], and we now briefly review their theorem.
Call a subset J ⊆ N of individuals a winning coalition, if for every profile
P and for every pair of alternatives x, y, if xPjy for every j ∈ J then x w(P) y.
A winning coalition can force the outcome of the SWF over x and y by voting
unanimously over these two alternatives.
Theorem 2 [18] If a SWF satisf ies UN and IIA, then the corresponding collec-
tion J of winning coalitions is an ultraf ilter over the set N .4
3This result seems to be a folk theorem. We will nevertheless give a new proof of this generalisation
in Section 2.4.
4A collection of subsets J is an ultrafilter if it contains the full set, is closed under finite
intersections, and is maximal in the follwing sense: for every subset J of N , exactly one of J and
its complement Jc = N \ J is in J [8].
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Arrow’s Theorem comes as a straightforward corollary, since every ul-
trafilter over a finite set is principal, i.e., it contains a singleton {i} [8]. This
means that a coalition J is a winning coalition if and only if it contains i, which
is therefore a dictator.
2.3 Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal
The Arrovian framework of SWFs can be extended by adding individual
“spheres of influence” as a model for individual rights. This model was
first proposed by Sen [25], who proved an impossibility result known as the
Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal. We follow here the presentation of this
result by Gaertner [14], adapting Sen’s Theorem to the case of linear orders.
A rights system is a collection of pairs of alternatives for which an individual
has the power to influence the result of the SWF. Formally, let D be a function
D : N → P(X × X ), such that if (x, y) ∈ D(i) and xPi y then also x w(P) y.
Sen’s framework for individual rights is composed of a SWF w and a rights
system D. The conditions that he argues to be minimal natural requirements
for such a framework are the following:
• UN: A SWF w satisfies unanimity if, whenever every individual strictly
prefers alternative a to alternative b , so does society. Formally, if aPib
for every individual i ∈ N , then a w(P) b (same condition as the one in
Section 2.1).
• MINLIB: w is minimally liberal with respect to D if there exist two
individuals i1 and i2 such that they are decisive in both ways with respect
to two alternatives each, i.e., there exist two individuals i1 and i2 and four
(not necessarily distinct) alternatives {x1, y1, x2, y2} such that both (x1, y1)
and (y1, x1) are in D(i1) and both (x2, y2) and (y2, x2) are in D(i2).
The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal is the following theorem:
Theorem 3 [25] There is no SWF that satisf ies UN and MINLIB.
The proof of this result is a straightforward reduction to a minimal case, and
we present here the main idea for the sake of comparison with the inductive
proofs we will introduce in the next section.
Proof Suppose individual i1 is decisive over the pair (x1, y1) and individual i2
over (x2, y2), and we assume that these 4 alternatives are pairwise distinct (the
other cases being easier to prove). Consider a profile P, where x1 P1 y1 and
x2 P2 y2, and for both i = i1 and i = i2 it is the case that y2 Pix1 and y1 Pix2. Then
by MINLIB we have that x1w(P)y1 and x2w(P)y2, and by UN that y2w(P)x1
and y1w(P)x2. This constitutes a cycle of w(P), contradicting our assumption
that w(P) is a linear order. unionsq
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2.4 Inductive Proofs
Recall that no assumption of finiteness was made to prove Sen’s Theorem, and
the method employed in this proof is a reduction from a general impossibility
to the base case of two individuals and four (or less) alternatives. We will
now present a similar method devised by Tang and Lin [27] to prove Arrow’s
Theorem. Tang and Lin [27] prove Theorem 1 by means of two inductive
lemmas, reducing the general statement to the base case of 3 alternatives and
2 individuals, and then verify this last step automatically with a computer.
The first lemma is the inductive step on the number of alternatives: “if there
exists a SWF for m + 1 alternatives and n individuals that satisfies Arrow’s
conditions, then there exists a SWF for m alternatives and the same number
of individuals that still satisfies Arrow’s conditions.” The contrapositive of
this lemma spreads the impossibility from the base case to every finite set
of alternatives: “if Arrow’s Theorem holds for the case of 3 alternatives
and n individuals, then it holds for every finite set of m alternatives and n
individuals”. We first generalise this result to also cover the case of an inf inite
number of alternatives:
Lemma 1 If there exists a SWF w for X and N , with |X | ≥ 3, that satisf ies UN,
IIA and ND, then there exists a set X ′ ⊆ X with |X ′| = 3 and a SWF for X ′ and
N that satisf ies the same properties.
Note that the contrapositive of Lemma 1 reads: “if Arrow’s Theorem holds
for the case of 3 alternatives and n individuals, then it also holds for any larger
set X (including the infinite case) and n individuals”.
Proof Let X ′ = {a1, a2, a3} be any set containing three different alternatives in
X . Every linear order P over X ′ can be extended to a linear order Pe over the
whole set X (though not in a unique way). Define a SWF w′ for X ′ and N in
the following way:
x w′(P) y :⇔ x w(Pe) y
where P is a preference profile over X ′ and Pe any extension of P to a
preference profile over X . By IIA this definition does not depend on the
extension chosen. Furthermore, w′ remains unanimous and independent of
irrelevant alternatives by definition. It remains to be shown that w′ is non-
dictatorial. Suppose the contrary: we prove that w would then be dictatorial
too, in contradiction with the assumptions. Let i be the dictator for w′, and
x and y two different alternatives in X , and suppose that xPi y in a certain
profile P. We now show that also x w(P) y must hold, thus i is a dictator on
every pair of alternatives in X . The case where both x and y are in X ′ is trivial.
We can therefore restrict ourselves to the case where there are at least two
distinct elements inX ′ different from x and y, a1 and a2. Let individual i change
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her preference relation such that a1 Pia2, obtaining profile P ′. Let now every
individual j (including i) rearrange her preference such that xPja1 and a2 Pjy,
and call this profile P ′′. Both steps can be done without affecting the initial
ranking of x and y, thus by IIA x w(P) y if and only if x w(P ′′) y. By unanimity
of w we have x w(P ′′) a1 and a2 w(P ′′) y. Since i is a dictator relative to X ′, it
must be the case that a1 w(P ′′) a2 holds, and thus by transitivity also x w(P ′′) y,
which as previously observed implies x w(P) y. unionsq
The second lemma of Tang and Lin [27] extends Arrow’s impossibility from
the case of two individuals to every finite setN . A generalisation to an infinite
set N , analogous to our Lemma 1, cannot be proved, for Arrow’s Theorem
does not hold for infinite societies, as we have seen in Section 2.2.
The proof methods presented in this section inspire a new terminology for
properties of SWFs. Let AX be a set of axioms or properties of SWFs. We say
that AX has the inductive property with respect to alternatives if an inductive
proof like that of Tang and Lin [27] can produce a SWF satisfying AX for
m − 1 alternatives starting from a SWF satisfying AX for m alternatives. We
can define the same property with respect to individuals. If a certain set of
axioms has the inductive property, then an impossibility result over a minimal
case will spread over SWFs of any finite size. We say that a set of axioms
AX satisfies the f inite model property (FMP) with respect to alternatives
(individuals) if from every SWF satisfying AX we can build a SWF over a finite
set of alternatives (individuals) that satisfies the same axioms. If this property
hold we can extend an impossibility result from the finite to the infinite case.
Finally, putting these two properties together, we have the reduction property:
from any SWF satisfying AX we can build another one that still satisfies the
same axioms but with a set of alternatives (individuals) of minimal size. The
proof of Sen’s Theorem is a proof that the axioms of unanimity and minimal
liberalism have the reduction property for both alternatives and individuals.
Our Lemma 1 proves that the Arrovian axioms have the reduction property
for alternatives. The inductive lemma by Tang and Lin [27] guarantees that
the same axioms have the inductive property with respect to individuals, but
Fishburn [12] shows that they do not have the finite model property.
3 Language for Axioms
In this section we present a formal system of axioms expressed in FOL to
model the social choice framework of preference aggregation. Our approach
borrows several ideas from Tang and Lin [27], whose main concern, however,
is a different one and who do not provide a complete axiomatisation. We
start by introducing a first-order language and we provide axioms to reason
about SWFs. We then formalise Arrow’s conditions in this language and, in a
slightly extended language, Sen’s conditions. We conclude by generalising our
axiomatisation to the case of weak orders.
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3.1 A Theory for Social Welfare Functions
The first step is to define a theory capable of reasoning about SWFs. In
Section 2 we have introduced the main objects: individuals, alternatives and
preference profiles. A closer look at Arrow’s axioms suggests that if we aim
at formalising such conditions with a first-order language we must be able to
quantify over all three objects separately. While a unary predicate can serve
the purpose by marking alternatives and individuals, problems arise when
dealing with quantification over all possible linear orders (the set of preference
profiles). At first sight this corresponds to a second-order quantification, but
exploiting the finiteness of the domain and the fact that two linear orders
can be generated from each other using a sequence of swaps, we are able
to devise a version of the condition of universal domain that holds on finite
models. Following Tang and Lin [27], we introduce a set of “situations” and
consider them as names for different preference profiles. In our case the set of
situations will be a subset of the domain marked by a unary predicate, allowing
us to quantify over this set. We will indicate with Pu the preference profile
associated with situation u. Call Lswf = {A(1), I(1), S(1), p(4), w(3)} the relational
first-order signature consisting of the following components:
1. three unary predicates to mark alternatives (A), individuals (I), and
situations (S).
2. a predicate p of arity 4 to represent, given an individual z and a situation
u, the linear order Puz associated with situation u. Orders are represented
as binary relations: p(z, x, y, u) indicates that individual z prefers x over y
in situation u.
3. a ternary relation w that stands for the SWF, producing the social pref-
erence relation w(Pu) for every situation u. w(x, y, u) translates as x is
preferred over y in the social order associated with situation u.
Formulas in this language express conditions for SWFs, and we now present
an axiomatisation to characterise this class. We start from the axioms of linear
order for p(z, ·, ·, u):
LINp: • I(z) ∧ S(u) ∧ A(x) ∧ A(y) → (p(z, x, y, u) ∨ p(z, y, x, u) ∨ x = y)
• I(z) ∧ S(u) ∧ A(x) → ¬p(z, x, x, u)
• I(z) ∧ S(u) ∧ A(x1) ∧ A(x2) ∧ A(x3) ∧
p(z, x1, x2, u) ∧ p(z, x2, x3, u) → p(z, x1, x3, u)
All axioms presented in this section are to be considered universally closed;
therefore the first axiom should be read as: “for all z, u, x and y, if z is
an individual, if u is a situation, and if x and y are alternatives, then either
individual z in situation u prefers x to y, or she prefers y to x, or x is equal
to y.” This is the completeness (or connectedness) axiom, and the second and
the third are the irreflexivity and transitivity axioms. Recall that a situation
u encodes a preference profile, so the quantification over S-variables is a
quantification over all preference profiles encoded in S. Further axioms will
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ensure that these are all the logically possible profiles of linear orders over X .
The analogous axioms for w(·, ·, u) follow:
LINw: • S(u) ∧ A(x) ∧ A(y) → (w(x, y, u) ∨ w(y, x, u) ∨ x = y)
• S(u) ∧ A(x) → ¬w(x, x, u)
• S(u) ∧ A(x1) ∧ A(x2) ∧ A(x3) ∧ w(x1, x2, u) ∧ w(x2, x3, u)
→ w(x1, x3, u)
These are axioms for collective rationality: they require the outcome of
aggregation to be a linear order. The next two sets of axioms guarantee that
there are at least 3 different alternatives, that A, I and S are non-empty and
that they form a partition of the universe:




PART: • A(x) → (¬I(x) ∧ ¬S(x))
• I(x) → (¬A(x) ∧ ¬S(x))
• S(x) → (¬I(x) ∧ ¬A(x))
• A(x) ∨ I(x) ∨ S(x)
The next two axioms restrict the arguments of p and w to be of the correct
type:
DEF: • p(z, x, y, u) → (I(z) ∧ A(x) ∧ A(y) ∧ S(u))
• w(x, y, u) → (A(x) ∧ A(y) ∧ S(u))
We now turn our attention to the encoding of the set of all preference
profiles into the set of elements marked by S. The first axiom guarantees that
two distinct situations cannot encode the same preference profile, thus the
encoding of situations into preference profiles must be injective:
INJ: S(u) ∧ S(v) ∧ u = v →
∃z.∃x.∃y.[I(z) ∧ A(x) ∧ A(y) ∧ p(z, x, y, u) ∧ p(z, y, x, v)]
To express the condition of universal domain in our language, and to be
able to quantify over the entire set of situations, we use another idea due to
Tang and Lin [27]: identify the set L(X ) with the symmetric group S(X ) of all
permutations over X and generate it via transpositions. This is the job of the
next axiom:5
PERM: p(z, x, y, u) → ∃v. {S(v) ∧ p(z, y, x, v) ∧
∀x1.[p(z, x, x1, u) ∧ p(z, x1, y, u) → p(z, x1, x, v) ∧ p(z, y, x1, v)] ∧
∀x1.[(p(z, x1, x, u) → p(z, x1, y, v)) ∧ (p(z, y, x1, u) → p(z, x, x1, v))] ∧
∀x1.∀y1.[x1 = x ∧ x1 = y ∧ y1 = y ∧ y1 = x→(p(z, x1, y1, u)↔ p(z, x1, y1, v))] ∧
∀z1.∀x1.∀y1. [z1 = z → (p(z1, x1, y1, u) ↔ p(z1, x1, y1, v))]}
5Observe that in this axiom the variables x1, y1, and z1 must be explicitly quantified, because they
are within the scope of an existential quantifier; the other variables x, y, z, and u are (as before)
implicitly bound by the universal closure of the axiom.
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The complexity of this axiom is largely due to the fact that linear orders are
being represented as binary relations. Given our representation of Pi not as a
complete sequence of elements in X but as a subset of X 2, we have to require
that, given a situation u, an individual z, and two alternatives x and y, there
exists another situation v such that (the following five items correspond to the
five lines of the axiom):
1. the relative positions of x and y have been switched in Pvz;
2. if an alternative x1 was between x and y in Puz , then its relation with respect
to x and y is switched in Pvz;
3. if x1 was more preferred than x in Puz , then in v it is more preferred than y
(and thereby also x); if it was less preferred than y in Puz , then in v it is less
preferred than x (and thereby also y).
4. for every pair of alternatives different from x and y the relative ranking is
copied;
5. Pvz′ = Puz′ for every individual z′ = z.
Call Tswf the theory composed of all the axioms above. In Section 4 we will
prove a completeness result with respect to the class of models that can be
constructed from SWFs, providing a formal argument to the claim that Tswf
characterises the class of SWFs. It is worth noting that some of our axioms,
such as PART or INJ, are not strictly required. Including these axioms gives
us more “control” in the resulting models and improves the readability of the
axiomatisation.
3.2 Arrow’s Axioms
We are now able to formalise the conditions that lead to Arrow’s impossibility
result. Adding to Tswf the next three axioms we obtain a theory that we shall
call Tarrow:
UN: S(u) ∧ A(x) ∧ A(y) → [(∀z.(I(z) → p(z, x, y, u))) → w(x, y, u)]
IIA: S(u1) ∧ S(u2) ∧ A(x) ∧ A(y) →
[∀z.(I(z) → (p(z, x, y, u1) ↔ p(z, x, y, u2))) → (w(x, y, u1)
↔ w(x, y, u2))]
ND: I(z) → ∃x.∃y.∃u.[S(u) ∧ A(x) ∧ A(y) ∧ p(z, x, y, u) ∧ w(y, x, u)]
Let us analyse in detail the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives.
The first universal quantification provides us with two generic situations u1 and
u2 and two alternatives x and y. The main implication then states that if all
individuals do not change their preference about x and y when moving from
situation u1 to u2, then the social outcome w(x, y, u1) in the first situation must
be the same as w(x, y, u2). On a finite set X of alternatives the permutation
axiom guarantees that this applies to all logically admissible profiles.
Several weaker versions of the axiom of independence have been proposed
in the literature, in an attempt to escape Arrow’s impossibility result. An
axiomatisation of these frameworks can be obtained by simply replacing the
axiom of independence presented in this section with a formalisation of the
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weaker version. For instance, the notion of ternary and m-ary independence
proposed by Blau [6] can be expressed in our language by modifying appro-
priately the antecedent of the current formalisation, to account for three (or
more) alternatives.
3.3 Weak Orders and General Aggregation Procedures
Arrow’s Theorem was initially formulated for weak orders [2], and in this
section we provide a suitable modification of Tswf to cover this and more
general cases.
To allow for ties in the preferences of the individuals the first axioms to be
modified are that of linear order LINp, changing irreflexivity into reflexivity:6
WEAKp: • I(z) ∧ S(u) ∧ A(x) ∧ A(y) → (p(z, x, y, u) ∨ p(z, y, x, u) ∨ x = y)
• I(z) ∧ S(u) ∧ A(x) → p(z, x, x, u)
• I(z) ∧ S(u) ∧ A(x1) ∧ A(x2) ∧ A(x3) ∧
p(z, x1, x2, u) ∧ p(z, x2, x3, u) → p(z, x1, x3, u)
The same can be done for collective rationality formalised in LINw. Things
get more complicated for what concerns the coding of situations. While the
axiom INJ can be kept without modifications, the axiom of permutation has to
be significantly changed to be able to construct the whole set of weak orders
from a single situation. This can be done in the following way. First introduce
an axiom that states the existence of a preference profile where all individuals
are indifferent over all alternatives:
PERM1: ∃u.S(u) ∧ (∀z.∀x.∀y. I(z) ∧ A(x) ∧ A(y) → p(z, x, y, u))
The second step is to modify the permutation axiom to enable us to separate
indifferent alternatives, putting one of the two at the bottom of the order:
PERM2: p(z, x, y, u) ∧ p(z, y, x, u) →
(∃v1. {S(v1) ∧ ∀x1.[(x1 = y) → p(z, x1, y, v1) ∧ ¬p(z, y, x1, v1)] ∧
∀x1.[x1 = y → p(z, x, x1, v1) ↔ p(z, x, x1, u)] ∧
∀x1.∀y1.[x1 = x∧x1 = y ∧ y1 = y ∧ y1 = x→(p(z, x1, y1, v1)↔ p(z, x1, y1, u))] ∧
∀z1.∀x1.∀y1. [z1 = z → (p(z1, x1, y1, v1) ↔ p(z1, x1, y1, u))]} ∧
∃v2.{S(v2) ∧ ∀x1.[p(z, x1, y, v2)] ∧ ∀x1[(∀x2 p(z, x2, x1, u)) ↔ p(z, y, x1, v2)] ∧
∀x1.[x1 = y → p(z, x, x1, v2) ↔ p(z, x, x1, u)] ∧
∀x1.∀y1.[x1 = x ∧ x1 = y∧y1 = y ∧ y1 = x→(p(z, x1, y1, v2)↔ p(z, x1, y1, u))] ∧
∀z1.∀x1.∀y1. [z1 = z → (p(z1, x1, y1, v2) ↔ p(z1, x1, y1, u))]})
6We will not change the name of the predicate p in the language, interpreting it as representing
preference (weak or strict).
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The first part of the axiom separates alternatives x and y that were clustered
together, and sends y to the bottom of the order making it strictly dominated
by every other alternative. The second part does the same job, but clusters
y together with the alternatives that constituted the bottom of the initial
situation u. It is easy to see that in this way we can generate all weak orders
over a finite set of alternatives. At last, Arrow’s conditions have to be adapted
to conclude the axiomatisation of the framework. This can easily be done,
paying particular attention to the unanimity axiom that is usually stated for
the “strict part” of the order Ri (recall that a is strictly preferred to b iff aRb
and ¬b Ra).
Analogously to what we have done for the case of weak orders, the
definition of a SWF can be modified to cover the case of preferences
represented as partial orders in the social output. More generally, we call
aggregation procedure a function that associates a collective binary relation
over X with a profile of binary relations over the same set X supplied
by the individuals. This is the case of SWFs, where both input and out-
put of the function are linear (or weak) orders. As we have seen in this
case, with a suitable modification of the axioms LINp and LINw we can
control, respectively, the properties of individual and collective preference
relations. For instance, by removing the axiom of completeness from LINw
we obtain SWFs which output an incomplete ranking of the alternatives.
While classical social choice theory concentrates on total preference rela-
tions, either weak or linear orders, partial orders are attractive for both
theoretical and computational reasons, for instance when the set of alter-
natives is too large to enable individuals to compare each pair of alterna-
tives [23].
The main drawback of this approach is that a new axiom generating a
universal domain, corresponding to PERM, has to be devised for any such
system. In Section 4.4 we take one step further, proving that the condition of
universal domain for linear orders (on both finite and infinite domains) is not
first-order axiomatisable.
3.4 Sen’s Framework of Individual Rights
In this section we provide additional axioms to formalise Sen’s framework
of individual rights. The language Lswf has to be enriched with a new pred-
icate d to represent decisive sets, obtaining the following signature Lsen =
{A(1), I(1), S(1), p(4), w(3), d(2)}. The interpretation of these symbols is the same
as for Lswf, with d representing the decisive sets of player i in the following
way: d(i, x, y) holds iff (x, y) ∈ Di.
We now define the theory Tsen by adding to the theory Tswf three axioms.
First, since the relation d encodes the decisive sets of the individuals, in the
next set of axioms we state that decisive sets are symmetric (if (x, y) ∈ Di then
(y, x) ∈ Di), irreflexive (if (x, y) ∈ Di then x = y), and in analogy to p and
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w we require its arguments to be of the correct type. The final axiom in the
following list encodes the meaning of decisiveness by relating d to the SWF w.
DEC: • I(z) ∧ A(x) ∧ A(y) ∧ d(z, x, y) → d(z, y, x)
• I(z) ∧ A(x) → ¬d(z, x, x)
• d(z, x, y) → (I(z) ∧ A(x) ∧ A(y))
• d(z, x, y) → ∀u.p(z, x, y, u) → w(x, y, u)
Second, we formalise the conditions of Sen’s Theorem:
UN: • S(u) ∧ A(x) ∧ A(y) → [∀z.(I(z) → p(z, x, y, u)) → w(x, y, u)]
MINLIB: • ∃z1.∃z2.∃x1.∃y1.∃x2.∃y2.[(d(z1, x1, y1) ∧ (d(z2, x2, y2) ∧ (z1 = z2)]
The first axiom, UN, is the same axiom of unanimity as for the Arrovian
framework, and the second axiom, MINLIB, formalises minimal liberalism,
stating that for at least two distinct individuals there are two alternatives on
which they are decisive.
3.5 Formalisations in Other Logical Languages
While we are not aware of any other work exploring the limits of classical
FOL in expressing the Arrovian framework of SWFs, there have been several
contributions to the literature making proposals for a full formalisation of
Arrow’s Theorem, using a variety of logical frameworks. In this section, we
briefly review some of them.
A number of results in social choice theory have been proved by Tang [26]
using the inductive method we sketched in Section 2 (see also Lin [19] for
a more general view). Tang and Lin [27] use a formalisation in the style of
the Situation Calculus to model and ultimately automatically prove or even
discover theorems in social choice theory. This language proves very useful for
the purpose of automatically checking base cases of theorems such as Arrow’s.
In these small domains it is possible to list all instances of their formalisation
of the axioms in propositional logic, and later check the (un)satisfiability of
these formulas using a SAT solver. While our first-order language borrows
several ideas from their approach, it constitutes a language in the logical sense
of this term, and enables us to study results concerning axiomatisability and
expressivity. Moreover, our language requires less mathematical fatigue to
support the automation, since no inductive lemmas have to be proven before
an implementation can take place. In addition to that, it does not require us to
specify the number of alternatives and of individuals explicitly in the language.
On the other hand, as we shall briefly discuss in Section 5, automatically
proving an impossibility theorem from axioms expressed in our language, while
possible in principle, is highly demanding in practice.
Second-order logic of orders is the natural candidate to write axioms like
PERM, and it has indeed been employed by Nipkow [21] and Wiedijk [31]
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to formalise the proof of Arrow’s Theorem using automatic theorem checkers
like Mizar and Isabelle. In Section 5 we review this approach more in detail.
The labelling of variables with unary predicates like I, S and A immediately
suggest an alternative formalisation in many-sorted first-order logic [10]. This
approach has been followed by Geist and Endriss [16] in the related field of
ranking sets of objects, i.e., the study of how to extend preferences from alter-
natives to set of alternatives, and provides a more readable axiomatisatisation.
Agotnes et al. [1] and Troquard et al. [29] develop modal logics for ex-
pressing concepts from social choice theory, including Arrow’s Theorem. In
the first paper the authors provide a modal framework capable of reasoning
about preference and judgment aggregation, providing a formal proof in their
language of a key lemma in the proof of Arrow’s Theorem. The second
work concentrates on social choice functions (i.e., procedures that associate
a subset of alternatives to every profile), and provides a sound and complete
axiomatisation of this class. The authors present logical formalisations of
several axioms, with a focus on strategy-proofness. Both these approaches
obtain interesting and useful results for the specification and verification
of properties of aggregation procedures. However, the logical systems they
introduce are specifically built for this purpose, and their potential for a full
formalisation of impossibility theorems is limited by the fact that the number
of individuals is fixed in their language.
A formalisation in dependence logic has been sketched by Väänänen
(personal communication, 2009). It represents an interesting approach in
which it relates the Arrovian axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives
with concepts of dependence embedded in this logic. The drawback of this
axiomatisation is, again, that the number of alternatives and of individuals
appears explicitly in the axioms.
4 Formalisation of Impossibility Theorems
In Section 3 we have referred to Tswf as the theory of SWFs, and in this section
we justify this choice by proving that Tswf axiomatises the class of SWFs.
Using the terminology introduced by Pauly [22], we prove that Tswf absolutely
axiomatises the set of SWFs, i.e., a model for Lswf represents a SWF if and only
if it satisfies the theory Tswf. To be precise, this is true for the finite case. In
the general case, Tswf axiomatises a set of partial SWFs defined on subdomains
satisfying a certain condition of closure. This translates in the finite case into an
absolute axiomatisation of all SWFs. To do so we will associate with every SWF
w a modelMw of Tswf, and then prove a completess result. This enables us to
determine precisely to what extent the three theorems we have introduced in
Section 2 can be formally derived from our axioms. We shall assume for the
rest of the section that the set of alternatives is non-empty and contains at
least 3 elements, and that the set of individuals is non-empty.
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A model of Tswf is a structure M = (M, A, I, S, p, w), specifying the inter-
pretation of every symbol in the language presented in Section 3.
Definition 1 If w is a SWF for X andN , thenMw is the following Lswf-model:
1. the universe M = X unionsqN unionsq L(X )N , the disjoint union of the sets corre-
sponding to the three unary predicates A, I and S (in particular the set
S is equal to the set of all preference profiles L(X )N );
2. (z, x, y, u) ∈ p ⇔ x Puz y, where Puz is the preference relation of z in profile
u; and
3. (x, y, u) ∈ w ⇔ x w(Pu) y.
If X is finite, then the resulting modelMw is unique. In the case where X is
infinite, on the other hand, this is not the only model that can be built from w.
To obtain a full characterisation we need the following definition:
Definition 2 Given a set X , let S(X ) denote the set of permutations over X .
A transposition is a permutation that switches just two elements of the set.
G ⊆ S(X ) is closed under transpositions if whenever g ∈ G, g ◦ τ ∈ G for every
transposition τ .
Observe that if X is finite, then the only subset of S(X ) closed under
transpositions is S(X ) itself.
Let now w be a SWF on an infinite set of alternatives X . We have already
remarked that we can identify the set L(X ) with the set S(X ) of all permu-
tations over X . With every choice of Gi ⊆ S(X ) closed under transpositions
for every individual i ∈ N we can associate a model of Tswf, using the same
construction as in Definition 1, except that the set of situations is now the
Cartesian product S = ∏i∈N Gi. In the finite case this definition boils down
to Definition 1, because L(X ) is the only possible choice for Gi for every
individual. The following completeness result shows that these are all possible
models of Tswf:
Proposition 1 M |= Tswf if and only if there exist two non-empty sets X andN ,
with |X | ≥ 3, and a SWF w for X and N such thatM =Mw.
Proof It is easy to prove that Mw is a model of Tswf. By definition, for every
z and u the relations p(z, ·, ·, u) and w(·, ·, u) are linear orders over X , so the
LINp axioms are satisfied as well as LINw. The axioms MIN, PART and INJ
are valid by virtue of items (i) and (ii) in Definition 1. The set of situations
S is either the set of all preference profiles or a Cartesian product
∏
i∈N Gi
of subsets of L(X ) closed under transpositions. This is sufficient to validate
axiom PERM. To see this, let u be a situation in S and i an individual, and
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consider for every pair of alternatives the linear order obtained by switching
these two alternatives in the order of individual i in situation u. This procedure
is equivalent to composing an element in Gi (the order of individual i in u)
with a transposition. Since Gi is closed under transpositions, the new profile
we obtain is still an element of S, i.e., there exists a situation v that represents
it. Thus, the axiom of permutation is satisfied.
Suppose now that M |= Tswf. We can define the two sets N and X as the
subsets of the universe indicated by the unary predicates. With every element
in S we can associate a preference profile, the one encoded by the relation pM.
From the relation wM we can define a partial SWF, whose domain is the set
of all preference profiles encoded in S, a subset G ⊆ L(X )N . By PERM, if we
take the projection of G on every component i, denoted with Gi, we obtain a
set of linear orders that is closed under transpositions: for every individual
i, if g ∈ Gi then g composed with every transposition (a swap of a pair of
alternatives) is still in Gi. Thus G is of the form
∏
i∈N Gi, and M =Mw as
defined in Definition 1. unionsq
4.1 Arrow’s Theorem
As we have seen, if the set of alternatives is finite we can associate a unique
SWF with every model of Tswf. Therefore, by virtue of Proposition 1, we can
restate Arrow’s Theorem as follows:
Theorem 4 Tarrow has no f inite models.
Despite its theoretical interest, a result like Theorem 4 is of little prac-
tical use for a potential application to automated reasoning. What should
be sought is a formalisation of Arrow’s theorem in a sentence that can
be derived formally from our theory. The first attempt of proving the in-
consistency of Tarrow fails, because Arrow’s Theorem does not hold in the
case of an infinite number of individuals, as we have seen in Section 2.2.
(The issue of an infinite number of alternatives, on the contrary, is fully
resolved by Lemma 1.) Fishburn’s result [12] translates in our framework
into the existence of an infinite model M of Tswf such that M |= (UN ∧
IIA ∧ ND). Since there is no first-order formula that characterises finite
models (see e.g. Enderton [10]), we have to somehow circumvent this
problem.
One possibility is to give up some generality and to fix the number of
individuals with a set of additional axioms. Call Tnswf the theory composed of
all axioms of Tswf plus the following axiom:
∃z1, . . . , zn.I(z1)∧. . .∧ I(zn)∧(∧k = j zk = z j) ∧[I(z) → (z = z1) ∨ · · · ∨ (z = zn)]
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With a proof analogous to that of Proposition 1 we obtain a completeness
result for Tnswf with respect to SWFs defined for a set N of n individuals. Now
the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2 If w is a SWF for X and N with |X | ≥ 3 and |N | = n, and if
Mw is the corresponding model, then Mw |= ¬(UN ∧ IIA ∧ ND). Therefore,
for every n, Tnswf  ¬(UN ∧ IIA ∧ ND).
Proof If the number of alternatives is finite, then the first part of this result
is a direct consequence of Arrow’s Theorem. In case there are an infinite
number of alternatives, we can resort to a proof similar to that of Lemma 1
to reduce a model Mw, constructed from a SWF w, to a base model for
only 3 alternatives that agrees with the initial model on the three Arrow’s
conditions. The key observation is that in the proof of Lemma 1 we never used
the condition of universal domain in its full generality: every time we defined
a new profile, it was always constructible with a finite sequence of switches
between pairs of alternatives. The condition of closure under transpositions
therefore guarantees that the result extends to everyMw defined on a finite set
N . Since the conjunction of Arrow’s conditions is falsified on the base model,
then it is falsified also on the initial model constructed on an infinite number
of alternatives. The second part of the statement follows by completeness
of FOL. unionsq
4.2 The Kirman-Sondermann Theorem
To formalise the Kirman-Sondermann Theorem we have to first encode in our
language the statement that the set J of “winning coalitions” is an ultrafilter:
• N ∈ J : [∀z.I(z) → p(z, x, y, u)] → w(x, y, u)
• Closure under intersections: w(x, y, u1) ∧ w(x, y, u2) → [(∀z.I(z) →
(p(z, x, y, u1) ∧ p(z, x, y, u2) ↔
p(z, x, y, v))) → w(x, y, v)]
• Maximality: [∀z.I(z) → (p(z, x, y, u) ↔
¬p(z, x, y, v))] → (w(x, y, u) ↔
¬w(x, y, v))
Call UF the conjunction of these axioms. It is important to note that these
axioms characterise the notion of ultrafilter for this particular framework
only. We now prove the following restatement of the Kirman-Sondermann
Theorem:
Theorem 5 Tswf ∪ {UN,IIA}  UF:
Proof We will prove that all modelsMw of Tswf ∪ {UN, IIA} verify all axioms
in UF, and conclude using completeness of FOL to obtain provability. By the
Kirman-Sondermann Theorem, if w satisfies UN and IIA then the collection of
winning coalitions is an ultrafilter. Let thenMw be a model built from w. The
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first axiom of UF is clearly satisfied, since the SWF is unanimous. The second
axiom states that whenever in two situations x is ranked higher than y, then in
every other situation, if the intersection of the individuals who ranked x higher
than y in the two previous situations continue to do so, then x should still be
ranked higher than y. This axiom is valid by closure under intersections of the
set of winning coalitions of w. The only detail requiring attention is that Mw
could be defined over a (transposition-closed) subset of the universal domain.
This constitutes no problem, as no axioms require the existence of particular
profiles. With similar reasoning we can prove that the last axiom of maximality
is also valid inMw. unionsq
Note that the condition of non-dictatorship included in Tarrow corresponds
to requiring the ultrafilter to be free (i.e., non-principal): the existence of a
dictator is equivalent to characterising the set of winning coalitions as those
subsets containing an element i of N . This gives a formal proof that the set of
winning coalitions under Arrow’s conditions must be a free ultrafilter. Since it
is not possible to build a free ultrafilter over a finite set [8], we get an indirect
formalisation of the argument presented by Fishburn [12]: if a SWF satisfies
UN, IIA and ND, then the number of individuals must be infinite.
4.3 Sen’s Theorem
The case of Sen’s Theorem is easier. The theorem does not presuppose the
finiteness of the domain of aggregation, and its proof works by reduction: given
a SWF satisfying Sen’s axioms, by restricting this function to the two decisive
individuals on to a restricted set of three alternatives we derive a contradiction.
The proof of Proposition 1 can be easily adapted to Sen’s framework, and
Theorem 3 is therefore equivalent to the following:
Theorem 6 Tsen is inconsistent (it has no models).
We conclude this section with some general statements about the formalisa-
tion of axioms for SWFs. Using the terminology introduced in Section 2.4, we
can state that if a set of axioms has the reduction property with respect to both
alternatives and individuals, then an impossibility result corresponds to the
theory formalising these axioms being inconsistent (cf. Sen’s Theorem). If they
only satisfy the inductive property instead, an impossibility result corresponds
to the inconsistency of the theory in the finite case (cf. Arrow’s Theorem).
In the other direction, exploiting results in logic to obtain properties of the
axiomatic requirements, the finite model property of a set of axioms could be
obtained by analysing the shape of the first-order formulas used to translate
them (see, e.g., [9]).
4.4 Universal Domain
In Section 3 we put forward two axioms to formalise the condition of universal
domain for linear and weak orders. These axioms are rather complex, and rely
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heavily on the assumption of finiteness of a model to generate all possible
profiles of preferences. In this section we prove a non-axiomatisability result
for the class of SWFs satisfying the axiom of universal domain over arbitrary
sets of alternatives, thus justifying our choice of the axiom PERM as the best
approximation to formalise the condition of universal domain in our first-order
language.
If M is a model of Tswf, we say that M satisfies the condition of universal
domain if for every possible profile of linear orders there is a situation u that
encodes it. Call U this class of models. What we seek is a Lswf-formula ϕ that
axiomatises this class. This turns out to be impossible, as we show next:
Proposition 3 There is no Lswf-formula ϕ such that for all models M of Tswf,
M |= ϕ if and only ifM satisf ies the condition of universal domain. That is, the
classs U is not Lswf-axiomatisable.
Proof For the sake of contradiction, suppose such a formula ϕ does exist.
Since Lswf is finite, using the downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, we can
construct a countable model M1 of Tswf ∪ ϕ. Recall that the universe of M1
is partitioned into three sets X1, N1 and S1. Let X1 be the set of elements of
M1 marked by predicate A. If X1 is finite, then the set L(X1) of all linear
orders over X1 is also finite. The universal domain L(X1)N1 can therefore be
either finite, if N1 is also finite, or uncountable in the case of an infinite set
of individuals. Since S1 encodes the universal domain andM1 is countable we
conclude that X1 cannot be finite. Suppose then that X1 is countable. Then
the set L(X1) is not countable. (This can be seen in the following way: every
countable ordinal induces a non-isomorphic linear order over X1, therefore
the cardinality of L(X1) is at least the cardinality of β1, which is uncountable.)7
This is a contradiction, sinceM1 is countable and S1 is a subset of the domain
ofM1. unionsq
5 Conclusion
In this work we have presented a first-order axiomatisation of social welfare
functions, formalising successfully three important results in social choice
theory. First, we have presented a first-order language and a theory for
SWFs, we have formalised Arrow’s conditions, and we have extended the
language to cover the model of individual rights proposed by Sen [25]. We
have been able to reduce non-trivial conditions to first-order statements, such
as independence of irrelevant alternatives and the universal domain condition.
A thorough study of the formalisation of the universal domain condition
has been carried out throughout the paper, especially in Section 3.3 and
Section 4.4, to cover the case of weak orders and of general sets of alternatives.
7More precisely, ℵ1 = |ω1| ≤ |L(X1)| ≤ |P(X1 × X1)| = 2ℵ0 .
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In Section 4 we have focused on three famous theorems in social choice theory,
namely those of Arrow [2], Sen [25], and Kirman and Sondermann [18]. We
have explored to which extent they can be formalised and formally derived
from the first-order axioms presented in Section 3. Sen’s Theorem stands out
as the easiest case, whose proof (a reduction proof, using the terminology
introduced in Section 2.4) enables us to state an easy correspondence between
the original statement and the inconsistency of the FOL axioms formalising
Sen’s conditions. For the case of Arrow’s Theorem we have solved the issue
of an infinite number of alternatives by proving Lemma 1, which reduces
the impossibility to the case of 3 alternatives. Arrow’s statement is therefore
equivalent to the unsatisfiability of our axioms in finite models. We have
also proved that, if the number of individuals is fixed in our language, then
there is a formal derivation of Arrow’s Theorem from our axioms. For the
most general case of a possibly infinite number of individuals we have proved
that a statement inconsistent with the assumption of an infinite society can
be formally derived from Arrow’s conditions, formalising in this way the
Kirman-Sondermann Theorem. In Section 3.5 we have discussed related work
that deals with formalising results in social choice theory in languages other
than FOL.
Here lies the first of several ideas for future work. A comparison study
between our formalisation and that in stronger logics or languages might lead
to the use of more powerful theoretical results, for instance from model theory.
A closer study of the relation between finite model properties and the “shape”
of some of our axioms might lead to simpler proofs of our axiomatisability
results, and might lead to interesting results by using methods from descriptive
complexity theory [9]. In this direction, interesting connections with the work
of Herzberg and Eckert [17] might be expected.
The results proved in Section 4 support the belief that automated reasoning
can play a role in proving theorems of social choice theory, and we carried
out some preliminary experiments using an automated theorem prover. The
system we have chosen is Prover9, the successor of the well-known and widely
used Otter theorem prover [20]. The task of writing an input file containing
our axiomatisation does not pose a serious challenge, thanks to the simplicity
of the syntax and the high readability of our axioms. However, to date we have
not been able to automatically prove the theorems formalised in this paper. It
is very likely that a suitable reformulation of the axioms, in a way that can help
and guide the work of the theorem prover, would prove successful in increasing
its speed and efficiency. Readers interested in this problem can find the list of
all the axioms for Sen’s Theorem in Appendix A. We have tested Prover9, as
well as the equational theorem prover E [24], on this list of axioms, without
obtaining a result after a reasonable amount of time, except for a minimal
case with just two individuals and three alternatives where we instantiated the
axiom of permutation for the 36 situations.
There is a growing literature concerning the use of automated reasoning in
social choice theory, and we conclude this paper by reviewing some of these
results. As mentioned before, Tang and Lin [27] have shown that Arrow’s
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Theorem in its general form (for finite X and N ) follows from Arrow’s
Theorem for 3 alternatives and 2 individuals. For this base case, these authors
give a formalisation in propositional logic. While the number of SWF’s is
already prohibitively large in this case (namely 636 ≈ 1028), a complete instan-
tiation of Arrow’s conditions for 36 profiles in the base case is still feasible, and
Tang and Lin [27] report that unsatisfiability can be verified using a state-of-
the-art SAT solver in less than 1 second. This approach, altough successfull in
providing new proofs of several classical theorems of social choice theory, has
the drawback of not being easily generalised and adapted to other frameworks,
since for every new application new inductive lemmas have to be proved, and
new instanciations have to be generated.
The same method was employed and enhanced by Geist and Endriss [16] in
the related field of ranking sets of objects. In this work the authors are able
to prove a general inductive lemma for a set of axioms sharing a common
structure, and they devise a complete procedure to automatically discover
(im)possibility theorems by listing the formalisation of several of these axioms,
and automatically going through all combinations.
A different approach is the one adopted by Nipkow [21] and Wiedijk
[31]. These authors verify formally two proofs of Arrow’s Theorem given by
Geanakoplos [15] using proof checkers for higher-order logic (the Isabelle and
Mizar system, respectively). The condition of finiteness of the set of individuals
is expressible in these higher-order languages (and for these particular proofs,
this condition must be stated also for the set of alternatives), making it possible
to prove the full statement of Arrow’s Theorem. This is the only approach so
far where neither the number of individuals nor the number of alternatives is
specified in the language.
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Appendix A: Tsen in Prover9 Syntax
formulas(sos).
% LIN_p
(I(z) & S(u) & A(x) & A(y)) -> (p(z,x,y,u)|p(z,y,x,u)|x=y).
(I(z) & S(u) & A(x)) -> -p(z,x,x,u).
(I(z) & S(u) & A(x) & A(y) & A(v) & p(z,x,y,u) & p(z,y,v,u) )
-> p(z,x,v,u).
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% LIN_w
(S(u) & A(x) & A(y)) -> (w(x,y,u)|w(y,x,u)|x=y).
(S(u) & A(x) & A(y)) -> -w(x,x,u).
(S(u) & A(x) & A(y) & A(v) & w(x,y,u) & w(y,v,u)) -> w(x,v,u).
% DEC
d(z,x,y)->(I(z) & A(x) & A(y)).
d(z,x,y)->d(z,y,x).
d(z,x,y)->(x!=y).
d(z,x,y) -> (all u p(z,x,y,u) -> w(x,y,u)).
% PART
A(x) -> (-I(x) & -S(x)).
I(x) -> (-A(x) & -S(x)).
S(x) -> (-I(x) & -A(x)).
A(x) | I(x) | S(x).
% DEF
p(z,x,y,u)->(I(z) & A(x) & A(y) & S(u)).
w(x,y,u)->(A(x) & A(y) & S(u)).
% INJ
S(u) & S(v) & (u!=v) -> exists z exists x exists y
(I(z) & A(x) & A(y) & p(z,x,y,u) & p(z,y,x,v)).
% PERM
p(z,x,y,u) -> exists v (S(v) & p(z,y,x,v) &
(all x1 (p(z,x,x1,u) & p(z,x1,y,u) -> p(z,x1,x,v)
& p(z,y,x1,v))) &
(all x2 (p(z,x2,x,u) -> p(z,x2,y,v))) &
(all x3 (p(z,y,x3,u) -> p(z,x,x3,v))) &
(all x4 all y1 (x4 != x & x4 != y & y1 != y &
y1 != x -> (p(z,x4,y1,u) <-> p(z,x4,y1,v)))) &
(all z1 all x5 all y2 (z1 != z ->
(p(z1,x5,y2,u) <-> p(z1,x5,y2,v))))).
% UN
(S(u) & A(x) & A(y)) ->
(( all z (I(z) -> p(z,x,y,u))) -> w(x,y,u)).
% MINLIB
exists z1 exists z2 exists x1 exists y1 exists x2
exists y2 (d(z1,x1,y1) & d(z2,x2,y2) & z1!=z2).
end_of_list.
618 U. Grandi, U. Endriss
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